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SERVICE AS A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS IN
ACTIONS IN PERSONAM

·A

PRIME requisite of due process is, of course, that the court
shall have jurisdiction of the subject-matter. "To give such
proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its
constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the
subject-matter of the suit." 1 In proceedings in personam-proceedings to determine the personal liability of the defendant, no property being brought by the proceedings within the control of the
court-the court must also have jurisdiction of the defendant.
Attempts have repeatedly been made to take jurisdiction of nonresident defendants through service by publication or through personal service made outside of the state in which the action is brought.
The Supreme Court has held that such procedure does not give
jurisdiction of the non-resident, for a state cannot in that way
extend its jurisdiction beyond its territorial limits. The defendant
"must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process in the
State, or by his voluntary appearance." 2
Since a state may exclude a foreign corporation (except when it
desires to engage in interstate commerce, or to act in the state for
the Federal govemment) 3 it may compel such corporation as a condition of entrance to appoint an agent in the state upon whom service may be made, and such service will give jurisdiction.4 The statute may, however, simply provide that if a corporation does business in the state, service may be made upon one of its agents in the
state, or upon a state officer. Such statutes have been upheld either
upon the theory of implied consent to such service, 5 or upon the
theory that the corporation, having voluntarily come into the state
to do business there, is bound by the state's reasonable regulations

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 733.
Ibid.; Harkness v. Hyde, g8 U. S. 476; Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S.
41 ; Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. l8g.
3 Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 ; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648.
4 Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.
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SERVICE IN ACTIONS IN PERSONAM

of such business.6 It has also been held _that to require a corporation engaged in interstate commerce to appoint an agent upon whom
service may be made in controversies arising within the state is not
an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce ;7 ·but, if the statute attempts to compel such a corporation to subject itself to the
jurisdiction of the state courts in all controversies wherever arising,
this would probably be held to burden interstate commerce unreasonably. 8
Under the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article Four
of the Constitution a natural person, a citizen of one of the states,
cannot be excluded from doing business in any other state.9 A
Kentucky statute provides that "in actions against an individual
residing in another State * * * engaged in business in this State, a
summons may be served upon the manager, or agent of, or person
in charge of, such business in this State, in the County where the
business is carried on, or in the County where the cause of action
occurred." 10 Upon a cause of action which arose in Kentucky, an
action was brought against non-resident partners who had done
business in Kentucky through W. Flexner as their agent, process
being served upon W. Flexner, who at the time of the service had
ceased to be such agent. Judgment was obtained in Kentucky and
sued upon in Illinois, where the court gave judgment for the defendant, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.11 The
case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on the
ground that full faith and credit was not given to the Kentucky
judgment. Justice Holmes in his brief opinion, affirming the judgment of the Illinois court, said :12
"It is argued that the pleas tacitly admit that Washington
Flexner was agent of the firm at the time of the transaction
s Smolik v. Philadelphia and R Coal and Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148, approved
in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Mi1ling Co., 243

u. s. 93.

International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579.
s See Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197·
9 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wallace (U.S.) 418, 430; Blake v. McClung,
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Kentucky Civil Code, sec. 51 (6).
11 Flexner v. Farson, 268 Ill. 435.
12 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 28g.
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sued upon in Kentucky, and the Kentucky statute is construed as purporting to make him agent to receive service
in suits arising out of the business done in that State. On
this construction it is said that the defendants by doing business in the State consented to be bound by the service prescribed. The analogy of suits against insurance companies
based upon such service is invoked. Mtitual Reserve F1md
Life Association v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147· But the consent
that is said to be implied in such cases is a mer~ fiction,
founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States could
exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could
establish this obligation as a condition to letting them in.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404. Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.
S. 93, 96. The State had no power to exclude the defendants
and on that ground without going farther the Supreme Court
of Illinois rightly held that the analogy failed, and that the
Kentucky judgment was void. If the Kentucky statute purports to have the effect attributed to it, it cannot have that
effect ~n the present case. New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518, 522, 523/'
Probably the justifiable deduction from this opinion is that, in
the case of a natural person, a citizen of another state, no service
will give jurisdiction, .except personal service within the state or
voluntary appearance, unless actually consented to by the defendant. Yet we have seen that a reasonable regulation as to service of
process upon a foreign corporation entering to engage in interstate
commerce may be imposed, though the corporation cannot be
excluded from the state. Similarly, a regulation as to natural persons entering to do business within the state, providing for service
of process upon an agent in the state where a cause of action arises
within the state, would seem not to deny such persons any privilege
or immunity of citizens of the· state, but rather to put them on an
equal footing with such citizens. In Kane v. New J ersey13 a state
statute requiring that a non-resident automobile owner should,
before operating his car in the state, appoint the Secretary of State
13 242

U. S.
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his agent upon whom process might be served in any action arising
out of the operation of his car in the state, was held constitutional.
It is possible that Fle.x-ner v. Farson will be ultimately held to stand
only for the proposition that there was no jurisdiction of the
defendants because W. Flexner was, at the time of service, no longer
their agent.14
A resident of one of the states of the Union who is a citizen of
the United States is also a citizen of the state in which he resides.15
But a person may also, of course, be domiciled in a state who is a
citizen of a foreign country. IWhether a person is a citizen of the
state or not, the state clearly may authorize its courts to take jurisdiction of him when he is within the state. By the common law,
jurisdiction in a proceeding in personam was acquired by personal
service upon the defendant within the jurisdiction; if he could not
be found, pressure was brought upon him to appear by proceedings
in outlawry.16 "One thing our law would not do, the obvious thing.
It would exhaust its terrors in the endeavor to make the defendant
appear, but it would not give judgment against him until he had
appeared. * * * Instead of saying to the defaulter, 'I don't care
whether you appear or no,' it set its will against his will: 'But you
shall appear.' " 17 The practice, however, has been very generally
. adopted by our state legislatures of allowing substituted service of
process, by leaving it at the defendant's residence, or of allowing
constructive service by publication, in cases where the defendant
cannot be found and personally served. It is believed that substituted service has been held due process and to give the court jurisdiction, where the defendant is domiciled in and is actually within
the state, in all cases where the constitutional question has been
considered in the state courts. Such service is treated as on the
same footing with personal service. 18 The verdict of the state
14 For a very interesting discussion of this subject, see Scott, ."Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within a State," 32 HARV. L. Rsv.
871, to which the writer acknowledges his indebtedness in connection with
the preceding part of the discussion.
ia Const. of U. S., Amend. XIV, Sec. I.
1a 3 Black. Comm. 283.
17 Perry, Common-law Pleading, I5I.
is Bimeler v. Dawson, 5 Ill. 536; Biesenthall v. Williams, I Duv. (Ky.)
329; Cassidy v. Leitch, 2 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 315; Continental Nat. Bk v.
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courts is also that constructive service by publication is due process
and gives the court jurisdiction as against a defendant domiciled
in and actually within the state, on the ground that such a person
owes obedience t9 the laws of the state, and the state has a right to
prescribe by law how· he shall be brought into its courts, as long as
the methods used are reasonably probable to apprise him of the proceedings,19 although it is very reasonably insisted in one case that
such servic~ is not due process except when it appears that defendant could not be found within the jurisdiction and personally
served.20
It is not easy to determine the position of the Supreme Court of
the United States with regard to the validity of substituted service
and of constructive service by publication upon persons domiciled
in and actually within the state, in actions in persona11i. In Webster
v. Reid21 commissioners appointed to partition certain Indian lands
sued the owners and had process served by publication according
to the laws of the territory. The Supreme Court held the judgment
void, declaring that the "suits were not a proceeding in rem against
the land but were in personani against the owners of it. Whether
they all resided within the territory or not does not appear, nor is
Thurber, 74 Hun. (N. Y.) 632, affirmed on opinion below in 143 N. Y. 648;
Bernhardt v. Brown, II8 N. C. 700; Bryant v. Shute's Ex'r., 147 Ky. 268,
and cases cited at p. 275 of the opinion.
19 Holt v. Alloway, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) I08; Welch v. Sykes, 8 Ill. 197;
Matter of Empire City Bk., 18 N. Y. 199; Harryman & Schryver v. Roberts,
52 Md. 64; Betancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461 (action commenced by attachment treated as an action in person am) ; Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97
(foreclosure action treated as action in personam). In Bickerdike v. Allen,
157 Ill. 95, the court held that in an action in personam service by publication is not sufficient, but that if process is also mailed to defendant's residence this is prima facie evidence that he received it, and therefore such
service is prima facie valid.
"That a man is entitled to some notice before he can be deprived of his
liberty or property, is an axiom of the law to which no citations of authority
would give additional weight; but upon the question of the length of such
notice there is a singular dearth of judicial decision. It is manifest that the
requirement of notice would be of no value whatever unless such notice
were reasonable and adequate for the purpose." Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S.
398, 409.
20 Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97.
21 (1850) II Howard 437.
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it a matter of any importance. No person is required to answer in
a suit on whom process has not been served, or whose property has
not been attached. In this case there was no personal notice, nor
an attachment or other proceeding against the land until after the
judgments. The judgments therefore are mere nullities and did
not authorize the executions on which the land was sold." This
seems a pretty explicit decision against service by publication in
an action strictly personal, whether the defendant is a resident within
the state or not. In Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Company 22 the
court said, merely by way of dictuni: "We do not mean to say that
personal service is in all cases necessary to enable a citizen to acquire
jurisdiction of the person. When the defendant resides in tlie State
in which the proceedings are had, service at his residence and perhaps other modes of constructive service may be authorized by the
law of the State." In Earle v. McVeigh23 the court had before it a
case where service was attempted by posting on the door of defendant's former residence, he having been seven months out of the
state. The court held that the house in question was not defendant's "usual place of abode" as required by the state statute, and
that the service was, therefore, invalid. But the court said, "Doubtless constructive notice may ·be sufficient in certain cases," and apparently approved of service.at the actual place of residence of one domiciled in the state. The next case is that of Pennoyer v. N eff,24- in
which the action was against a non-resident and in which service by
publication was held insufficient. The court's discussion is directed
to the question before it, but it quotes with approval the statement
quoted above from Webster v. Reid and declares in general language
that in an action in personam the defendant "must be brought within
its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance." 25 The next year the Supreme Court had before
it a case where the action was one in personam, and in which process
was served by leaving it at defendant's residence with his wife. A
state statute authorized such service if defendant could not be found.
There was no averment in the sheriff's return that he could not
22

(1873) 19 Wallace 58, 61.
(1875) 91 u. s. 503.
24 (1877) 95
71425 Ibid. 733.
23

u. s.

MICHIGAN LAW REV!EW

find defendant. For this reason the judgment was held void. The
court said, "Substitute service in actions purely in personani was a
departure from the rule of the common law, and the authority for
it, if it could be allowed at all, must have been strictly followed." 26
In Harkness v. Hyde, 21 it appeared that in an action in personani
process out of a court of Idaho territory was served personally
upon the defendant at his residence on an Indian reservation. The
reservation was, by treaty with the Indians -and by legislation, put
outside of the jurisdiction of the territory of Idaho. It was held
that the service was invalid and the resulting judgment therefore
void. The court said :28
There can be no jurisdiction in a court of a territory to
render a personal judgment against any one upon service
made outside its limits. Personal service within its limits,
or the voluntary appearance of the defendant is essential in
such cases. It is only where property of a non-resident or
of an absent defendant is brought under its control, or where
his assent to a different mode of service is given in advance
that it has jurisdiction to inquire into his personal liabilities
or obligatioh.; without personal service of process upon him,
or his voluntary appearance to the action. Our views on this
subject are expressed at length in the late case of Pennoyer
v. Neff (95 U. S. 714) and it is unnecessary to repeat them
here.
The fair deduction from these expressions of opinion by the
Supreme Court would' seem to be that the court does not consider
service by publication to be due process in an action strictly in personani even though the defendant ·be domiciled in and be actually
within the state from whose court the process issues. This point
seems to be actually involved in the decision in Webster v. Reid.
Harkness v. Hyde had to do with a non-resident, but the statement
in the case as quoted above is very strong to the effect that personal
service within the state or voluntary appearance is always necessary. In Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Company and in Earle v.
Settlemier v. Sullivan (1878), 97 U. S. 444, 447.
(1878) 98 u. s. 476.
28 Ibid. 478.

26

27
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•'

McVeigh where a broader view is intimated the court may have
had actions in rem in mind. It is impossible to say whether the
court would be influenced by the more liberal view of the state
courts, if the question were now brought before it. 20 It is believed,
however, that service by publication may without unreasonable hardship to plaintiffs be restricted to actions in rem, which include
actions commenced by attachinent. Substituted service where process is left at the residence of the defendant, stands on a different
footing. It is_ treated by the state courts, not as distinct from, but.
as a kind of personal service. It is believed that the Supreme Court
would probably take the same position in view of the expressions
by that court quoted above, and particularly in view of the suggestion to be dealt with shortly which was thrown out in the recent case
of McDonald v. Mabee, 30 that substituted service may be good even
upon a resident defendant when out of the state.
When a person is domiciled in a state but is temporarily outside
of the state at the time of service of process in an action -in personam two questions are raised-has the state authority over such
person, and if so what means of service constitute due process? It
has been held that a court of a state may only be given jurisdiction
over those actually within the state-that an attempt to give to a
court jurisdiction of a person who, though domiciled within the
state, is actually outside of the state, is an attempt to invade the
sovereignty of the state where he is. 31 However, the weight of
authority in state courts seems to be on the other side. The theory
is that a person domiciled in a state or country "owes allegiance to
the country and submission to its laws. * * * By reason of the rela29 In the recent case of McDonald v. Mabee (I9I7), 243 U. S. go, the
court refused to express any opinion on 'this point.
30 243 u. s. 90.
31 De La Montanya v. ·De La Montanya, 112 Calif. IOI, three judges dissenting. Similar declarations are found in Amsbaugh v. Exchange Bk., 33
Kan. 100, though there it seems that the service was not at defendant's "usual
place of residence," as required by the statute, and in Smith v. Grady, 68
Wis. 2I5, though that case involved an action brought in Ontario against
one who, though a British subject, was not a resident of Ontario and was
served personally outside of Ontario. It is not clear whether Moss v. Fitch,
212 Mo. 484 and Raher v. Raher, I50 Ia. 511, were meant to support the
same proposition, or were meant only to determine that the methods of
service there adopted were invalid.
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tion between the State and its citizen, which affords protection to
him and his property and imposes upon him duties as such, he may
be charged by judgment in personani binding on him everywhere as
the result of legal proceedings instituted and carried on in conformity to the statute of the State prescribing a method of service
which is not personal and which maY. not become actital notice to
him. And this may be accomplished iri his lawful absence from the
State. It, therefore, becomes important to inquire whether the
State of Wisconsin was the domicile of the defendant at the time
the constructive service was made there, because it is upon domicile
that his civil status depends."32 Three methods of service upon an
absent resident have been attempted, namely, personal service outside of the state, service at the defendant's residence and service by
publication. If the state has authority to give the court jurisdiction of the person of a resident temporarily out of the state, service
of process at his residence would seem to constitute due process.33
This would seem to follow from the general view that StJ.ch service
is valid against a resident who is within the state, and because it is
a way reasonably likely to give him notice of the proceedings. The
Supreme Court, though being careful not to express a definite opinion on the point, has intimated that such service may be valid under
the circumstances stated.34 Personal service on a resident while outside of the state has been held bad by the Supreme Court of the
United States,35 and by the state courts.36 Although this is clearly
3 2 Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 578, 580, cited with approval in
de Meli v. de Meli, 120 N. Y. 485, 495, and in Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387,
396. (This is not in conflict with Grubel v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, where
the court refused to enforce a judgment in Germany against a German citizen, who, however, was domiciled in New York, where the action was ill
personam and the process was served by publication.) In accord, Sturgis v.
Fay, 16 Ind. 429; Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504; Fernandez v. Casey
and Swasey, 77 Tex. 452; Ouseley v. Lehigh Val. T. and S. D. Co., 84 Fed.
602. Fro:tMAN ON JunGMJ>NTS (4th ed.), sec. 570.
33 Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429; Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun. (N. Y.) 578.
This seems to be the effect of Botna Valley St. Bk. v. Silver City Bk., 87
Ia. 479. Two judges in Raher v. Raher, 150 Ia. 511, expre5sly take this view;
three do not express themselves upon this point.
34 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. go.
35 Ibid.
36 Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, overruling Hamill v. Talbott, 72 Mo. App.
22; 81 Mo. App. 210; Raher v. Raher, 150 Ia. 511.
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the best method of giving actual notice to an absent resident of the
proceedings pending against him, it is held to constitute an attempt
to give extra-territorial effect to the mandate of the state court.
Service by publication has in one case been held invalid as against
an absent resident. 31 In another case it has been held valid.38 In a
third jurisdiction it has been held that a judgment obtained upon
such a service is at most voidable by the defendant, and cannot be
treated as void by the plaintiff.39 If the Supreme Court is, as seems
to be the case, opposed to service by publication as against a resident defendant who is within the state, a fortiori would it be against
such service when the defendant is absent from the state. This
also is the fair deduction from McD011ald v. Mabee. 40 The English
courts have held that a judgment against an absent resident is valid
though based upon constructive service if sue.ti constructive service
is authorized by law.41
If a charter is granted by a state to a do=nestic corporation upon
condition that service may be made upon it through some public
officer, or by publication, such service being consented to would be
good. Aside from any such consent it would seem that the due
process clause would require the same sort of service upon a domestic corporation as upon a resident natural person. It has been held
that constructive service upon a domestic corporation, which does
not have an office in the state, is due process when reasonable in
character."'2
Cornell University.
CHARLES KELLOGG BURDICK.
31 De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, II2 Calif. IOI; three judges dissenting. And see; Bernhardt v. Brown, II8 N. C. 700.
38 Fernandez v. Casey and Swasey, :n Tex. 452.
39 Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504; Stockwell v. McCracken, '109
Mass. 8440 243 u. s. 90.
41 Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686 (public proclamation in court, in the
market place and on the seashore, according to Scottish law); Becquet v.
MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951 (process served upon a public officer to be forwarded to the defendant in accordance with the law of the colony); Maubourquet v. Wyse, I Ir. Rep. C. L. 471 (similar decision as to French judgment).
42 Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River R. Co., 70 Minn. !05 (service of
process upon the Secretary of State with direction to mail a copy to the office
or to an officer of the corporation); Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White
Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626 (service by publication).

